Russia launches missiles on Ukraine. Russia advances (little) in Donbas. Russia meets with China. All eyes are focused on the geopolitical arena of the war in Ukraine. But in the meantime, this past 2022 North Korea surpassed its last ballistic missile launch record: more than 70. With the arrival of 2023, the escalation of arms has not stopped. This week, Pyongyang launched the Hwasong-17, the longest-range missile in its arsenal — 1,000 kilometers for 4,151 seconds (69 minutes). The date was not chosen by chance, just as the United States and South Korea were conducting military exercises.
In the midst of the hurricane of international tension, Kim Jong-un regularly sharpens, launches, examines and checks his missiles. Is it to give a message? Are you trying to show that Russia is not alone? Are you looking for confrontation with the United States and South Korea? To answer these questions, El Confidencial has interviewed Felix Arteagaprincipal investigator of the Elcano Royal Institute and expert in Defense and Security.
ASK. What is the purpose of North Korea’s increased missile launches? Why so much military activity on the peninsula?
ANSWER. What all this quantity and variety of essays show is that this has not been prepared overnight in February, taking advantage of the fact that Russia has invaded Ukraine. This was part of the army’s development and training program and the truth is that most of the launches of the past year have been of an operational nature. It is about refining (or improving) the credibility of the rocket launch vectors, in all their dimensions. With which, I believe that we are facing a phase of maturity of the missile program, which is about to become operational.
A few months ago, in a single day, they launched forty missiles, more than they had done, for example, in all of 2019. It’s not that they’re forcing or throwing away everything they have to show their strength to the United States, or to the United States. Always with South Korea. And they have not done so many tests of a specific missile: they have thrown missiles that were already working, they have increased their range, their charge, their trajectory and their combustion. They are perfecting them before leaving them operational. The result is that right now North Korea already maintains a level of credibility as a threat. Both in the nuclear variant and in the conventional one.
Q. Do you think that Kim Jong-un wants to show that Putin is not alone or, on the contrary, does he want to assert himself as a global threat?
R. Well, what he always wants to show is that he is a regional actor that is not taken into account and that should be taken into account, just like his nuclear and missile program. In turn, North Korea wants to have a capacity for independence from China, its main ally. He wants his missiles not to depend so much on Chinese technology or, of course, on Russia. What he wants to have is the ability to reserve the right to act autonomously.
Now all you are doing is increasing all the variety and number of answer choices you have to be more believable. Whether you have to face an escalation individually against South Korea and the United States or, if necessary, jointly with Russia and China. If Pyongyang were dependent on Russian or Chinese media and technology, it would not have that freedom. That is why all the nuclear powers, not only North Korea, but also France or the United Kingdom… have their own designs and reserve the last decision on the use of their weapons.
Josep Solano. tokyo
Q. Recently, the news began to proliferate that North Korea had sent weapons to Moscow, which were very out of date. Where is Kim’s arsenal at?
R. North Korea has an army very similar to the Russian one. It has a more developed part, but the vast majority is obsolete. For this reason, the country has always feared a conventional confrontation, since it would always favor the United States or South Korea. Their entire nuclear program exists to overcome that inferiority, demonstrating that they are now capable of launching not just all of South Korea, but Japan, Australia, or US bases in the Pacific.
They are deterrent capabilities that they did not have before. Previously, all they could hope for was to hold out long enough for China and Russia to support them, with aerial means or the like, much like what we have now seen (in reverse) in Ukraine. But now they have this other possibility, threatening strategic objectives of their potential rivals. That protects them from any South Korean or American act of aggression. They have a responsiveness that allows them to compensate for their conventional inferiority.
Q. One surprising thing about the sale of North Korean weapons to Russia is that Kim Jong-un has denied it. He has nothing to lose by selling arms to Russia. It is not a country that has foreign trade or is vulnerable to new Western sanctions. Why deny his relationship with Moscow?
R. These are communication strategies on the Russian side. Of course, Kim would like to appear as the great savior of Russia who comes to his aid with military equipment, but Vladimir Putin would not like this view at all. For this reason, neither one nor the other will publicly admit this type of treatment (if it has occurred). The same goes for China: it would never confirm the shipment of weapons.
You also have to be careful with the material that is verified as ‘transferred’, because it can be transferred simply components or ammunition. But it is very difficult for these new North Korean technologies that we have discussed to come to the fore. On the other hand, what is surely more available are all those missiles or projectiles of regulation endowment, since they have almost unlimited quantities in stock. Beyond that, North Korea does not have the industry to provide Russia with weapons to overcome resistance on the ground. Will exists, but capacity I see little.
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Lucas Proto
Q. Many of the headlines that have come out these weeks sound like ‘war escalation’ on the border of the peninsula. Do North Korea’s moves pose a real threat of escalation or is it just business as usual?
R. This strategy is periodic. It happens every year, taking advantage of the presence of a US president in South Korea or the joint maneuvers that are regularly carried out with the change of government in Seoul. There is always a campaign from the north to intimidate and deter, and in response, the United States deploys anti-missile batteries or increases the size of the maneuvers or increases the number of troops on the ground. This game is directed at the internal party and intended to justify the effort of the North Korean military forces in the face of what the government and the public believe are “imminent attacks” conventional by South Korea’s allies. They have lived by that logic since the end of the war in the peninsula. And that is what the regime maintains.
Q. At what stage is North Korea’s nuclear development? Do you also have outdated weaponry in this case?
A. Nuclear warheads are not outdated, but the means of delivery are. For this reason, the nuclear warheads are renewed periodically and they become smaller, because what it is about is to put as many as possible inside a rocket, so that, when the re-entry into the atmosphere begins, each target is directed to a different target.
In itself, all warheads have nuclear capacity, it does not matter if they are old or new. All they do is improve accuracy or head count. And that is, let’s say, the industrial technological escalation that the country is experiencing.
Russia launches missiles on Ukraine. Russia advances (little) in Donbas. Russia meets with China. All eyes are focused on the geopolitical arena of the war in Ukraine. But in the meantime, this past 2022 North Korea surpassed its last ballistic missile launch record: more than 70. With the arrival of 2023, the escalation of arms has not stopped. This week, Pyongyang launched the Hwasong-17, the longest-range missile in its arsenal — 1,000 kilometers for 4,151 seconds (69 minutes). The date was not chosen by chance, just as the United States and South Korea were conducting military exercises.
