It is difficult to evaluate the proposal that Boca tried to carry out in the Superclásico, without taking into account the expulsion of Marcos Rojo before 20 minutes, when the game was even, with a slight predominance of River. Such an early red and as avoidable as controversial, conditions any tactical system and much more if you receive a goal just a handful of minutes after that action.

The expulsion of Rojo conditioned the game for us. At 17 minutes we already had one less player, in a doubtful decision, which completely conditioned the game, “reflected Sebastián Battaglia after the game. “In a classic, staying with one less man so fast, it’s all uphill”, justified the coach

However, with the circumstances of the match already exposed, with the disadvantage on the scoreboard already fixed and with what was happening on the field, the messages that Battaglia sent were clear and, with the badge on, they left it quite in focus, beyond the expulsion and the justice of that decision.

The first reading of what Boca showed must be sought in the initial training, where the young people who gave it freshness at the beginning of the cycle were giving way to the more experienced footballers, who at some point seemed relegated and who were regaining ground. Names like Frank Fabra, Edwin Cardona, Pulpo González and Nicolás Orsini won space for the Sandez, Montes, Medina, Molinas or Luis Vázquez, as if to agree with that old phrase that “the classics are played with men.” It is counterfactual, but with the results in sight, it does not seem to have been the best decision of the technician, especially considering that many of those youths were promoted by him since he ran the Reserve.

But already with the 11 chosen, Battaglia’s strategy also seemed to run low. The first movement after the expulsion of Rojo, almost a reflex action, was to remove Cardona, his main generator of the game, and placed a center-back like Zambrano, a whole message that his players seemed to receive.

With the 0-2 at halftime, the Boca coach had to try to give a rudder stroke. The team was with 10, had been outmatched on the field and had to look for variants to change history. To get out there were a lot of candidates, because the individual performances had been in the subsoil. But in the income also the doubts – or certainties? – of Battaglia were exposed. The entries of Rolón and Medina had more to do with seeking to neutralize River than with a search to find alternatives to hurt in attack.

Could I do something else? In the bench he had alternatives in the younger ones like Molinas, Montes or Zeballos and even Briasco, who could give him another vision of the game and another quality of ball possession, as if to fight development in another part of the field. But that could mean losing balance in the middle of the court and being exposed, with spaces, for River’s replicas. It is not difficult to imagine that, with a 0-2 above, with ten men and with individual performances below expectations, in the xeneize locker room there has been more talk about avoiding a win than thinking about the heroic one. And so he went out to play the second half.

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